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warned that such a crisis might occur.1 So I want
to express my deep gratitude to the organizers of
this conference for giving me the opportunity to
say, “I told you so.” 
A BRIEF DIGRESSION ON THE
COST OF FINANCIAL GUARANTEES
Before discussing how and why the PBGC
got into this mess, there is a fundamental point
INTRODUCTION
F
inancial crises have a nasty habit of recur-
ring, but never in precisely the same way.
The differences can obscure the similari-
ties, which makes it difficult—but not impossi-
ble—to learn from our mistakes. In the 1980s we
had a long and costly learning experience with
deposit insurance—the Savings and Loan (S&L)
Crisis. It finally ended with a large taxpayer
bailout and the dismantling of the Federal Saving
and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC).
Now we face a crisis with the federal corpora-
tion that guarantees private pensions—the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). The current
crisis did not follow from some perfect storm of
unforeseeable factors. It was largely caused by
the same factor that led to the S&L Crisis and the
demise of the FSLIC: a mismatch between assets
and liabilities.
Perhaps the reason I was invited to speak at
this conference is that long ago, in 1991, I explicitly
Asset-liability mismatch was a principal cause of the Savings and Loan Crisis of the 1980s. The
federal government’s failure to recognize the mismatch risk early on and manage it properly led to
huge losses by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, which had to be covered by
taxpayers. In dealing with the problems now facing the defined-benefit pension system and the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), the government seems to be making some of the same
mistakes it made then. Among the causes is the fallacious belief that because pension funds have
a long time horizon the risk of investing in equities is negligible. In fact, the opposite is true. More-
over, for the PBGC, the mismatch risk is magnified by moral hazard and adverse selection. Distressed
companies facing the prospect of bankruptcy have an incentive to underfund their pension plans
and adopt risky investment strategies; healthy companies have an incentive to terminate their plans
and exit the system. The paper explores some ways to limit the costs of a potential PBGC bailout. 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, July/August 2006, 88(4), pp. 323-29.
1 The occasion was a conference held by the Federal Reserve Bank
of Cleveland in May 1991. The proceedings are published in
Sniderman (1993). Commenting on a paper delivered by Kathleen
Utgoff, who had just left the job of executive director of the PBGC,
I said this: “[Kathleen] seems reasonably confident that almost all
of the major perverse incentive problems facing the [PBGC] have
been fixed, while I do not. In particular, I am concerned that unless
the PBGC can impose some restrictions on the pension fund invest-
ment practices of financially weak plan sponsors, it may well face
a FSLIC-type crisis. Indeed, failure to understand the important role
of investment policy in determining the exposure of the govern-
ment guarantee fund was the critical factor in the severity of the
FSLIC crisis. I believe that similar factors are at work in the pension
arena, and understanding them may help to avert a crisis for the
PBGC” (Bodie, 1993, p. 161).
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         that I need to establish about the cost of providing
financial guarantees.2 Guarantees such as deposit
or pension insurance oblige the guarantor to make
the promised payment if the bank or pension fund
fails to do so. The economic loss to the guarantor
is equal to the difference between the promised
payment on the guaranteed contract and the price
received from the sale of the assets that are avail-
able from the issuer as collateral for this obligation.
This difference is called the “shortfall.” All assets
of the liability issuer that the guarantor has
recourse to seize are called “collateral.” 
To sustain itself, the guarantor must charge
a premium large enough to cover both actuarial
loss experience and operating costs. Viability is
achieved by a mixture of adequate premiums,
control of operating costs, and control of the
frequency and the severity of shortfall losses. 
For example, let us set the premium equal to
the cost of a single guarantee. For simplicity,
assume that there are no operating costs. If the
value of collateral assets, V, exceeds the promised
payments, B, the guarantor keeps the premium
and pays nothing. But if the value of assets is less
than the promised payments, the guarantor must
pay the difference, B – V. The guarantor’s maxi-
mum profit is equal to the premium plus interest
earned from investing the premium prior to pay-
ment of losses or expiration of the guarantee. This
maximum profit is diminished by the shortfall
or loss experience from issuer defaults. The
guarantor’s profit function is thus given by
where P is the premium and r is the interest rate.
The guarantor bears the full downside risk of
the collateral assets. It does not, however, partici-
pate in the upside gains that an owner of those
assets would receive. Because of this asymmetry,
the guarantor’s expected loss is an increasing func-
tion of the volatility (i.e., standard deviation) of
the difference between the promised payment B
and the asset value V. Therefore, to sustain them-
selves as viable economic entities without cross-
subsidies from other insured institutions or from
taxpayer funds, the guarantor must charge a
Pl r m a x B V + () −− [] 0,￿ ,
premium that is directly related to the volatility
of the difference between the market value of the
guaranteed payment and the market value of the
assets serving as collateral.
THE CURRENT PENSION 
INSURANCE MESS
The PBGC insures the pension benefits of the
44 million Americans covered by private defined-
benefit pension plans. Traditional pension plans
of the defined-benefit type have been declining
in relative importance in recent years. Companies
are (legally) terminating them and replacing them
with “defined contribution” plans such as 401(k)
plans that amount to tax-deferred private savings
plans. The number of private defined-benefit plans
peaked in the mid-1980s at 112,000. At that time,
about 40 percent of American workers were cov-
ered by them. Over the past two decades, the num-
ber of plans has fallen to just over 31,000 plans,
which cover only one worker in five. No large
companies have started defined-benefit plans in
recent years.
When a PBGC-insured pension plan is termi-
nated with insufficient assets to pay the benefits
promised to employees—typically, after an
employer bankruptcy—the PBGC takes it over
and makes up the shortfall. There is a cap on the
insured benefit, however, which is currently
$45,000 per employee per year. 
The expressed purpose of establishing the
PBGC was to insure a minimum level of promised
defined-benefit pensions against default risk of
the plan sponsor. However, if firms can transfer
their pension obligations to the PBGC, then the
government effectively pays a portion of the
workers’ total compensation because these obliga-
tions are linked to workers’ pay. The size of this
government subsidy can be large. Similarly, PBGC
insurance has served as a less visible way to guar-
antee the debt of financially troubled firms than
guaranteeing the bonds issued by these firms.
By law, the PBGC is supposed to finance all
of its operations from three sources: (i) the pre-
miums it collects from companies that still sponsor
defined-benefit plans, (ii) the assets it recovers
from terminated underfunded plans, and (iii) the
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its accumulated reserves. Premiums come from a
charge to plan sponsors of $19 dollars per single-
employer plan participant and $2.60 for multi-
employer participants.3 There is also a variable
premium charged to single-employer sponsors
with significant underfunding. The charge is $9
per $1,000 of unfunded vested benefits. 
Significantly, the funding requirements and
premiums charged by the PBGC are completely
unrelated to the way pension assets are invested.
A plan sponsor with 100 percent invested in equi-
ties has the same funding requirement and pays
the same premium as a sponsor with 100 percent
in fixed-income securities.
The PBGC now has a big deficit to cover. In its
annual report, the PBGC presents a balance-sheet
measure called “net position,” which amounts to
its assets minus its liabilities evaluated at current
market prices. The liability figure is the present
value of the future benefits that have already
become or are about to become an obligation of
the PBGC as a result of bankrupt underfunded
plans. If this net position is negative, it is a rough
estimate of the extra money the PBGC would have
to set aside today in the form of income-producing
assets to satisfy all claims. 
On November 15, 2004, the PBGC released its
annual report for fiscal year 2004, which ended
on September 30. It contains a financial summary
showing the net positions for single-employer and
multi-employer programs going back to 1995
(see Figure 1 and Table 1).
The trend is negative in both the single-
employer and multi-employer programs, but the
magnitude of the problem is much larger in the
former. In 1996, the single-employer program’s
net position was positive—that is, in surplus—
and it stayed positive until 2001, when it reached
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Figure 1
PBGC’s Net Financial Position
Table 1
PBGC’s Net Financial Position (billions of dollars)
Program 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Single-employer –0.315 0.869 3.481 5.012 7.038 9.704 7.732 –3.638 –11.238 –23.305
Multi-employer 0.192 0.124 0.219 0.341 0.199 0.267 0.116 0.158 –0.261 –0.236
Both combined –0.123 0.993 3.700 5.353 7.237 9.971 7.848 –3.48 –11.499 –23.541
3 Since this paper was written, the premium was raised from $19 to
$30 per insured person. For the most recent annual report, see
www.pbgc.gov/workers-retirees/about-pbgc/content/page13176.html.$7.7 billion. But in the past three years, the ink
has turned decidedly red: The deficit now stands
at $23.3 billion.
This deficit could get much bigger. As of the
end of the 2004 fiscal year, the PBGC’s estimate
of the underfunding in plans sponsored by com-
panies with credit ratings below “investment
grade”—that is, at significant risk of default—was
$96 billion. But even the $96 billion figure for
struggling companies is not the upper limit on
the possible deficit. The PBGC estimates that the
total underfunding in single-employer plans
exceeded $450 billion, while multi-employer plans
were under water to the tune of $150 billion.4
Those who created the present mess are blam-
ing a perfect storm of stagnant stock prices, low
interest rates, and industrial restructuring for the
PBGC’s problems, as if nothing could have been
done to prepare. But the current crisis did not
follow from some unforeseeable perfect storm. I
know this from personal experience: In the early
1990s, I was hired by the Department of Labor to
analyze the financial health of defined-benefit
pension plans. I concluded that there was a funda-
mental mismatch between the liabilities of these
plans—future pension payouts—and the assets
in which they were investing their reserves. This
mismatch meant that even plans that were fully
funded at the time could quickly become under-
funded as a result of changes in interest rates or
stock prices.
I submitted my report to the Department of
Labor’s Pension and Welfare Benefits Administra-
tion and briefed the executive director of the
PBGC on my findings. I also made my conclusions
known in the professional community. In an
article published in the Journal of Financial
Services Research in 1996—a time when the PBGC
and most of the plans it insures had comfortable
surpluses—I made this warning:
The possible “doomsday” scenario for the
defined-benefit pension system would be an
event such as a sharp and prolonged drop in
stock prices that causes a sharp decline in the
market value of pension asset portfolios.
Underfunding becomes much more prevalent.
Several major defaults of underfunded pension
plans lead the PBGC to significantly raise pre-
miums on the remaining plans in the system.
Expectations of even higher premiums in the
future lead sponsors of the well-funded plans
to terminate their defined-benefit plans to
avoid the PBGC “tax.” They buy annuities to
settle all benefits accrued under the terminated
plans and replace them with generous defined-
contribution plans, thus avoiding criticism
from their employees or from the public. Ulti-
mately, the United States could be left only
with bankrupt defined-benefit plans with the
benefits financed directly by taxpayers. (Bodie,
1996, p. 85)
It is worth noting that many of the pension
plans that are weak today were fully funded in
the late 1990s. Had they hedged their exposure to
a decline in interest rates at that time, they would
have easily survived the subsequent storm intact. 
There are important similarities between the
PBGC’s current situation and the situation faced
by the FSLIC in the 1980s. The FSLIC’s problems
began in the 1970s when interest rates became
high and volatile. Even S&Ls that held well-
diversified portfolios of mortgages became insol-
vent in the environment of rising interest rates of
the 1970s because the mortgages were long term
with fixed rates, while their deposit liabilities
were short term and rolled over at increasingly
higher market rates. 
Still more S&Ls became insolvent in the late
1980s because the real estate market collapsed.
Thus both of the market risks to which S&Ls were
exposed—interest rate risk and real estate risk—
took their toll. The biggest losses to the FSLIC
were incurred not as a result of fraud or even of
poorly diversified asset portfolios, but rather as
a result of failure on the part of regulators to act
quickly to stem the losses resulting from the asset-
liability mismatch.
In the case of the PBGC, the nature of the
liabilities of private defined-benefit pension plans
is very different from the short-term deposit liabil-
ities that were insured by the FSLIC. Therefore,
the type of assets that match those liabilities is
different. The similarity is that in both cases there
is a mismatch between the market-risk of the assets
Bodie
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4 The U.S. Congressional Budget Office (2005) estimates that the
cost exposure of the government for federal pension insurance
provided through the PBGC is currently about $135 billion.and liabilities that exposes the government guar-
antor to substantial shortfall risk.
Today, the PBGC appears to have been sucked
into that doomsday scenario. Why was my warn-
ing, which was solicited by the government itself,
completely ignored then, and why is it still being
ignored by Congress in its proposed pension
reform legislation?
The answer has its roots in a fundamentally
flawed belief about the nature of stock market risk
and reward, a belief that still guides the thinking
and the practices of the vast majority of profes-
sional pension actuaries and investment advisors.
It is the proposition that, although stocks are a
risky investment in the short run, they are a safe
bet in the long run.5
This mistaken proposition leads financial
professionals to advise their corporate clients
that they can significantly reduce the cost of
funding their long-term obligations to defined-
benefit plans by investing in diversified portfolios
of stocks instead of matching the liabilities with
a portfolio of bonds that delivers specified sums
of cash at specified times. 
The accounting profession has codified this
fallacy in the way it treats pension expenses in
company statements of profit and loss. Indeed,
under current rules, if a company should choose
to invest pension assets in bonds whose future
cash inflows exactly match the pension benefits,
the company would have to report higher pension
expenses and lower profits than would an iden-
tical company that invests in stocks. 
So what exactly is the fallacy? Consider a very
simple example. Assume that ABC company has
a defined-benefit plan for a single employee, Jane
Jones. Jane has worked for the firm for a year and
as a result has earned the right to a pension pay-
ment of $1,000 when she retires 20 years from
now. If the interest rate on bonds maturing in 20
years is 5 percent per year, the company would
have to invest $376.89 in such bonds today in
order to be certain to have $1,000 in 20 years to
pay to Jane. Under U.S. pension law, the bonds
would be held by a pension trust, so that even if
ABC were to go bankrupt Jane would still receive
her promised benefit.
The $376.89 is the “present value” of the
promised future pension benefit, and accounting
logic dictates that it is the amount of ABC’s pen-
sion expense in the current year. In each subse-
quent year, no matter what happens to interest
rates or stock prices, the value of the bond will
exactly match the pension liability. Underfunding
is impossible in these circumstances (as long as
the ability of the bond issuer to pay its debts was
in no doubt), and the PBGC will never have to
pay a dime to Jane.
But ABC’s pension consultant insists that ABC
consider an alternative. Because the pension pay-
ment is not due for another 20 years, ABC has
the option of investing in stocks to earn an
expected rate of return of 10 percent per year—
a plausible figure based on past stock market
returns. Sure, from year to year stock prices will
fluctuate, but over two decades the ups and downs
will cancel out. If it sets aside $376.89 for Jane’s
pension, ABC could—in fact, should—record a
profit on the difference between the 10 percent
long-run expected rate of return on stocks and
the 5 percent interest rate on the accruing pension
benefit. 
What is wrong with this reasoning? Fluctua-
tions in stock prices do not necessarily cancel out
over time, no matter how long the time period.
And contrary to the conventional actuarial reason-
ing, the risk of falling short of the target is actually
greater in the long run than in the short run. 
To see why, one need only check how much
it would cost for ABC to buy insurance against
such a shortfall. (The policy would make up the
difference between $1,000 and the value of the
stocks in the pension portfolio.) Both in finance
theory and in practice, the price of such insurance
(called a put option) increases with the length of
the time horizon.6
In our example, the cost of insuring against a
shortfall if the stock portfolio is worth less than
$1,000 in 20 years would be about $125. So to keep
the upside potential of the stock portfolio and still
be certain that at least $1,000 would be available
to pay Jane, ABC would have to lay out $125 in
addition to the $376.89 invested in stocks. And
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5 In fact, the opposite is true. This is shown in Bodie (1995).
6 See Bodie (1995) for a more complete explanation.this is assuming that all dividends from the stocks
are reinvested. So investing in stocks instead of
bonds does not lower the cost of the promised
pension benefit unless Jane is obliged to bear the
risk of not receiving it—or unless the PBGC is
there to pick up the extra cost of guaranteeing
the pension payout.
WHAT TO DO
Since the creation of the PBGC, many com-
panies have terminated their defined-benefit plans
and replaced them with less expensive defined-
contribution plans, thereby shifting to retirees
the risk of retirement portfolios that produce
disappointing returns. Ironically, one incentive for
doing this is the existence of PBGC insurance in
its current form. The current system overcharges
sponsors of healthy plans to subsidize the ailing
ones. Thus we have a classic case of the law of
unintended consequences: Insurance designed
to strengthen the traditional pension system
winds up accelerating its demise. 
Congress is now wrestling with these issues as
several pension reform bills are making their way
through the Senate and House of Representatives.
All of them include raising premiums, tightening
the pension funding rules, improving the meas-
urement and reporting of pension liabilities, and
attempting to increase the discipline of private
sponsors’ funding decisions. Higher premiums—
in particular, ones linked to the PBGC’s risk
exposure—would offset losses on future claims.
More accurate measurement of plans’ liabilities
would make the existing funding rules and pre-
mium schedule more effective.
But none of the pension reform bills has a
provision to take account of the asset-liability
mismatch in setting PBGC premiums or to restrict
the exposure of the PBGC by requiring closer
matching. There are two basic ways to achieve
this end. The first is for pension funds to invest
directly in fixed-income instruments that match
their pension liabilities. The second is by means
of swap contracts, which are less intrusive and
often less costly. 
Swaps are used to either hedge risks, as in
the case of interest rate swaps, or to insure against
risks, as in the case of credit default swaps. A
swap contract consists of two parties exchanging
(or “swapping”) a series of payments at specified
intervals (say, every six months) over a specified
period of time (say, ten years). The payments are
based on an agreed principal amount (called the
“notional” amount), and there is no immediate
payment of money between the parties. Thus,
the swap contract itself provides no new funds
to either party. 
Around the world today banks and investment
companies use swaps extensively to manage their
exposures to currency, interest rate, credit default,
and equity market risks and to lower their trans-
action costs. Pension funds have so far made
relatively little use of swaps.7 The advantage of a
swap contract is that it is noninvasive. Company
pension plans can continue to hold their equity
portfolios but eliminate the mismatch with their
liabilities with a debt-for-equity swap. 
Consider a company with large pension liabili-
ties, which are fixed in nominal terms and have
long durations. The company could enter in a
swap that exchanged returns on a stock market
index for a fixed interest rate. If the company (or
its designated fund managers) is particularly good
at managing the equity portfolio, the swap would
allow the firm to retain that value added. In this
way, it could eliminate the market risk of the
portfolio but retain the value-adding risk of the
superior fund-management performance. 
There is no shortage of potential counterparties
for such a transaction; any professional investor
seeking to increase its exposure to equity returns
would be interested. 
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